Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing
WebAssembly + Confidential Computing
Enarx first release brings WebAssembly to Confidential Computing
<p>The Enarx project reached a huge milestone: its first official release, featuring WebAssembly runtime. WebAssembly and Confidential Computing are a great match because WebAssembly offers developers a wide range of language choices, it works across silicon architectures, and it provides a sandboxed environment. This presentation will highlight the benefits of WebAssembly to Confidential Computing and showcase some demos.</p>
After 3 years since its inception, the Enarx project finally had its first official release, bringing WebAssembly to Confidential Computing.
Enarx is a deployment framework for running applications in TEE instances – which we refer to as “Keeps” – without the need to trust lots of dependencies, without the need to rewrite the application, and without the need to implement attestation separately.
The WebAssembly runtime, based on wasmtime, offers developers a wide range of language choices for implementation, including Rust, C, and C++. It is designed to work across silicon architectures transparently to the user so that the application can run equally simple on Intel platforms (SGX or the recently-announced TDX), AMD platforms (SEV) or forthcoming platforms such as Arms’ Realms and IBM’s PEF - all without having to recompile the application code. WebAssembly's sandbox model offers an extra layer of protection, isolating the application from the host.
Additional information
| Type | devroom |
|---|
More sessions
| 2/5/22 |
<p>A brief introduction to the room and to the sessions.</p>
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>Intel SGX provided a mechanism to better isolate user-level software from attackers. However, attackers will still use various methods to attack SGX and user’s Enclaves. And user’s code inside Enclave may also have bugs, which can be leveraged by the attackers. We are from intel SGX SDK team, we have conducted security analysis and pen-test for SGX Enclave (based on SGX SDK) during the past 10+ years. We want to summarize some past exploits we encountered in our daily work and what's the ...
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>Gramine (formerly called "Graphene") is a lightweight library OS, designed to run a single Linux application in an isolated environment. Currently, Gramine runs on Linux and Intel SGX enclaves on Linux platforms. With Intel SGX support, Gramine can secure a critical application in a hardware-encrypted memory region and protect the application from a malicious system stack with minimal porting effort ("lift and shift" approach).</p> <p>Several major events happened to the Gramine project in ...
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>Short break.</p>
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>Veracruz is a framework for designing and deploying privacy-preserving computations amongst a group of mutually mistrusting individuals. Veracruz uses strong isolation technologies, such as AWS Nitro Enclaves, Arm CCA Realms, and the high-assurance seL4 hypervisor, to provide a safe, neutral ground, within which a sandboxed WebAssembly program executes. Recent enhancements to Veracruz have made it possible to support larger, more complex privacy-preserving computations: we have adopted the ...
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>The confidentiality and integrity guarantees offered by Intel SGX enclaves can be easily thwarted if the enclave has not been properly designed. Its interface with the untrusted software stack is a perhaps the largest attack surface that adversaries can exploit; unintended interactions with untrusted code can expose the enclave to memory corruption attacks, for instance.</p> <p>We have proposed a notion, called orderliness, that embodies good practice set out by academic papers and the ...
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>Lunch break</p>
|
