Security
APT Reports and OPSEC Evolution, or: These are not the APT reports you are looking for
How advanced threat actors learn and change with innovation in security defense and constant APT reports, and how we can get better
27. Dezember 2015
23:00 – 00:00 In Kalender übernehmen
23:00 – 00:00 In Kalender übernehmen
Hall 2
With the advancement of defensive security and the constant release of research papers into their toolsets, advanced threat actors have had to adapt with new operational security practices, as well as with new technology.
With the advancement of defensive security and the constant release of research papers into their toolsets, advanced threat actors have has to adapt with new operational security practices, as well as with new technology.
Examples of this are how long it takes for a threat actor to take its operation offline once a public report of it's tools is getting released, or the technology it may be using to cope when its expensive code base that has taken years of development suddenly becomes public property.
Two quick examples are the geographical distribution of attacks, which are often (mis)used in attribution, and the use of cryptography for reuse of now public code bases.
Weitere Infos
| Format | lecture |
|---|---|
| Sprache | Englisch |
Weitere Sessions
| 27.12.15 |
Can we build trustworthy client systems on x86 hardware? What are the main challenges? What can we do about them, realistically? Is there anything we can?
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| 27.12.15 |
Unser Vortrag demonstriert einen PLC-only Wurm. Der PLC-Wurm kann selbstständig ein Netzwerk nach Siemens Simatic S7-1200 Geräten in den Versionen 1 bis 3 durchsuchen und diese befallen. Hierzu ist keine Unterstützung durch PCs oder Server erforderlich. Der Wurm „lebt“ ausschließlich in den PLCs.
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| 27.12.15 |
Dr. Peter Laackmann und Marcus Janke zeigen mit einem tiefen Einblick in die Welt der Hardware-Trojaner, auf welchem Wege „Institutionen“ versuchen können, sich versteckten Zugang zu Sicherheits-Hardware zu verschaffen.
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| 27.12.15 |
Key-Loggers are cool, really cool. It seems, however, that every conceivable aspect of key-logging has already been covered: from physical devices to hooking techniques. What possible innovation could be left in this field?
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| 27.12.15 |
This presentation covers windows kernel driver security issues. It'll discuss some background, and then give an overview of the most common issues seen in drivers, covering both finding and fixing issues.
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| 27.12.15 |
Did you ever want to have access to a few hundred thousand network end points? Or a few hundred thousand phone numbers? A short look behind the curtains of how not to do network security.
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| 27.12.15 |
For years SCADA StrangeLove team speaks about vulnerabilities in Industrial Control Systems. Now we want to show by example of railway the link between information security and industrial safety and demonstrate how a root access gained in a few minutes can bring to naught all the years of efforts that were devoted to the improvement of fail-safety and reliability of the ICS system. Railroads is a complex systems and process automation is used in different areas: to control power, switches, ...
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