Security
Check your privileges!
How to drop more of your privileges to reduce attack surface.
After defensive programming techniques and before attack method mitigations, the least privilege principle is our strongest weapon against exploitation. Much of the focus has been on how the admin can sandbox processes away.
A recent development is the idea that the process itself can „sandbox itself away“. This talk explores how that works in practice and is aimed at interested programmers.
This talk will mostly focus on seccomp-filter and namespaces on Linux, but it will also talk about capsicum (FreeBSD) and tame (OpenBSD), and old-school methods like ptrace and chroot, and cover capabilities. Also maybe a bit about systrace/selinux style approaches where the admin sets the profile from the outside, and why I chose to focus on letting the app sandbox itself instead.
Additional information
| Type | lecture |
|---|---|
| Language | English |
More sessions
| 12/27/15 |
Can we build trustworthy client systems on x86 hardware? What are the main challenges? What can we do about them, realistically? Is there anything we can?
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| 12/27/15 |
Unser Vortrag demonstriert einen PLC-only Wurm. Der PLC-Wurm kann selbstständig ein Netzwerk nach Siemens Simatic S7-1200 Geräten in den Versionen 1 bis 3 durchsuchen und diese befallen. Hierzu ist keine Unterstützung durch PCs oder Server erforderlich. Der Wurm „lebt“ ausschließlich in den PLCs.
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| 12/27/15 |
Dr. Peter Laackmann und Marcus Janke zeigen mit einem tiefen Einblick in die Welt der Hardware-Trojaner, auf welchem Wege „Institutionen“ versuchen können, sich versteckten Zugang zu Sicherheits-Hardware zu verschaffen.
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| 12/27/15 |
Key-Loggers are cool, really cool. It seems, however, that every conceivable aspect of key-logging has already been covered: from physical devices to hooking techniques. What possible innovation could be left in this field?
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| 12/27/15 |
This presentation covers windows kernel driver security issues. It'll discuss some background, and then give an overview of the most common issues seen in drivers, covering both finding and fixing issues.
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| 12/27/15 |
Did you ever want to have access to a few hundred thousand network end points? Or a few hundred thousand phone numbers? A short look behind the curtains of how not to do network security.
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| 12/27/15 |
For years SCADA StrangeLove team speaks about vulnerabilities in Industrial Control Systems. Now we want to show by example of railway the link between information security and industrial safety and demonstrate how a root access gained in a few minutes can bring to naught all the years of efforts that were devoted to the improvement of fail-safety and reliability of the ICS system. Railroads is a complex systems and process automation is used in different areas: to control power, switches, ...
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