Security

A Quick Stop at the HostileShop

HostileShop is a python-based tool for generating prompt injections and jailbreaks against LLM agents. I created HostileShop to see if I could use LLMs to write a framework that generates prompt injections against LLMs, by having LLMs attack other LLMs. It's LLMs all the way down. HostileShop generated prompt injections for a winning submission in OpenAI's GPT-OSS-20B RedTeam Contest. Since then, I have expanded HostileShop to generate injections for the entire LLM frontier, as well as to mutate jailbreaks to bypass prompt filters, adapt to LLM updates, and to give advice on performing injections against other agent systems. In this talk, I will give you an overview of LLM Agent hacking. I will cover LLM context window formats, LLM agents, agent vulnerability surface, and the prompting and efficiency insights that led to the success of HostileShop.
In this talk, I will give you an overview of **LLM Agent hacking**. I will briefly introduce LLM Agents, their vulnerability surface, and types of attacks. Because everything old is new again, I will draw some parallels to the 90s hacking scene. I will then present [HostileShop](https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/HostileShop), which is a python-based LLM Agent security testing tool that was selected as one of the [ten prize winners](https://www.kaggle.com/competitions/openai-gpt-oss-20b-red-teaming/hackathon-winners) in [OpenAI's GPT-OSS-20B RedTeam Contest](https://www.kaggle.com/competitions/openai-gpt-oss-20b-red-teaming/overview). HostileShop creates a fully simulated web shopping environment where an **Attacker Agent LLM** attempts to manipulate a **Target Shopping Agent LLM** into performing unauthorized actions that are automatically detected by the framework. HostileShop is best at discovering **prompt injections** that induce LLM Agents to make improper "tool calls". In other words, HostileShop finds the magic spells that make LLM Agents call functions that they have available to them, often with the specific input of your choice. HostileShop is also capable of [enhancement and mutation of "universal" jailbreaks](https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/HostileShop?tab=readme-ov-file#prompts-for-jailbreakers). This allows **cross-LLM adaptation of universal jailbreaks** that are powerful enough to make the target LLM become fully under your control, for arbitrary actions. This also enables public jailbreaks that have been partially blocked to work again, until they are more comprehensively addressed. For 1990s hacking vibes, HostileShop has a [text-based chat interface](https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/HostileShop?tab=readme-ov-file#basic-usage) that lets you chat with the attacker agent, or become the attacker yourself. For 2025 contrarian vibes (in some circles), HostileShop was vibe coded without an ounce of shame. Basically, I used LLMs to write a framework to have LLMs attack other LLMs. Crucially however, for reasons that I will explain in the talk, HostileShop does not use an LLM to judge attack success. Instead, success is determined automatically and immediately by the framework. At the time of this writing, HostileShop has [working attack examples for the entire LLM frontier](https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/HostileShop?tab=readme-ov-file#attack-examples), though things move very fast in this arena. There is a chance that by the time of the conference, all of the attacks that HostileShop is capable of discovering will have been fixed. In this case, the talk will focus on the current state of LLM security, the future of private Agentic AI, and either some thoughts on how to avoid complete dystopia, or amusing rants about the dystopia that has already arrived.

Additional information

Live Stream https://streaming.media.ccc.de/39c3/fuse
Type Talk
Language English

More sessions

12/27/25
Security
Jade Sheffey
Zero
The Great Firewall of China (GFW) is one of, if not arguably the most advanced Internet censorship systems in the world. Because repressive governments generally do not simply publish their censorship rules, the task of determining exactly what is and isn’t allowed falls upon the censorship measurement community, who run experiments over censored networks. In this talk, we’ll discuss two ways censorship measurement has evolved from passive experimentation to active attacks against the Great ...
12/27/25
Security
Fuse
Reports of GNSS interference in the Baltic Sea have become almost routine — airplanes losing GPS, ships drifting off course, and timing systems failing. But what happens when a group of engineers decides to build a navigation system that simply *doesn’t care* about the jammer? Since 2017, we’ve been developing **R-Mode**, a terrestrial navigation system that uses existing radio beacons and maritime infrastructure to provide independent positioning — no satellites needed. In this talk, ...
12/27/25
Security
Christoph Saatjohann
Zero
Zwei Jahre nach dem ersten KIM-Vortrag auf dem 37C3: Die gezeigten Schwachstellen wurden inzwischen geschlossen. Weiterhin können mit dem aktuellen KIM 1.5+ nun große Dateien bis 500 MB übertragen werden, das Signaturhandling wurde für die Nutzenden vereinfacht, indem die Detailinformationen der Signatur nicht mehr einsehbar sind. Aber ist das System jetzt sicher oder gibt es neue Probleme?
12/27/25
Security
tihmstar
One
While trying to apply fault injection to the AMD Platform Security Processor with unusual (self-imposed) requirements/restrictions, it were software bugs which stopped initial glitching attempts. Once discovered, the software bug was used as an entry to explore the target, which in turn lead to uncovering (and exploiting) more and more bugs, ending up in EL3 of the most secure core on the chip. This talk is about the story of trying to glitch the AMD Platform Security Processor, then ...
12/27/25
Security
One
The Deutschlandticket was the flagship transport policy of the last government, rolled out in an impressive timescale for a political project; but this speed came with a cost - a system ripe for fraud at an industrial scale. German public transport is famously decentralised, with thousands of individual companies involved in ticketing and operations. Unifying all of these under one national, secure, system has proven a challenge too far for politicians. The end result: losses in the hundreds of ...
12/27/25
Security
Ground
In August 2024, Raspberry Pi released their newest MCU: The RP2350. Alongside the chip, they also released the RP2350 Hacking Challenge: A public call to break the secure boot implementation of the RP2350. This challenge concluded in January 2025 and led to five exciting attacks discovered by different individuals. In this talk, we will provide a technical deep dive in the RP2350 security architecture and highlight the different attacks. Afterwards, we talk about two of the breaks in ...
12/27/25
Security
Fuse
FreeBSD’s jail mechanism promises strong isolation—but how strong is it really? In this talk, we explore what it takes to escape a compromised FreeBSD jail by auditing the kernel’s attack surface, identifying dozens of vulnerabilities across exposed subsystems, and developing practical proof-of-concept exploits. We’ll share our findings, demo some real escapes, and discuss what they reveal about the challenges of maintaining robust OS isolation.