SBOMS and supply chains

CRA-Ready SBOMs: A Practical Blueprint for High-Quality Generation

UD2.208 (Decroly)
Viktor Petersson
<p>As one of the co-leaders of the CISA working group on <a href="https://github.com/SBOM-Community/SBOM-Generation">SBOM Generation</a> and a contributor to its accompanying <a href="https://github.com/SBOM-Community/SBOM-Generation/blob/main/whitepaper/Draft-SBOM-Generation-White-Paper-Feb-25-2025.pdf">whitepaper</a>, I’ve spent the last few years deep in the trenches of SBOM creation. With the EU’s Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) raising the bar for software transparency and lifecycle security, the need for <em>reliable, high-quality</em> SBOMs has never been more urgent.</p> <p>In this talk, I’ll present a practical blueprint for SBOM generation that goes beyond minimal compliance and helps projects prepare for the expectations emerging from the CRA and similar regulatory frameworks. The model breaks SBOM creation into four clear phases:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Authoring</strong> – producing the initial SBOM from a lockfile</li> <li><strong>Augmenting</strong> – resolving gaps and adding metadata to meet increasingly strict transparency requirements that SBOM generation tools can't do</li> <li><strong>Enriching</strong> – improve the quality of the SBOM using open data sets</li> <li><strong>Signing</strong> – provide attestation to ensure the SBOM can be trusted</li> </ul> <p>I’ll discuss the technical considerations behind each phase, common pitfalls, and how these practices help projects avoid the compliance gaps many teams are now discovering as the CRA timeline approaches.</p> <p>To ground everything in reality, I’ll demo a fully open-source workflow built with the <a href="https://github.com/sbomify/github-action/">sbomify action</a>, a tool from <a href="https://sbomify.com">sbomify</a> that runs in GitHub Actions or any CI environment, enabling CRA-ready SBOM pipelines without proprietary tooling.</p>

Weitere Infos

Live Stream https://live.fosdem.org/watch/ud2208
Format devroom
Sprache Englisch

Weitere Sessions

01.02.26
SBOMS and supply chains
UD2.208 (Decroly)
<p>Welcome to another year of the SBOM devroom, now also including more general Supply Chain topics!</p> <p>The organizers will introduction the topics and the structure of the devroom.</p>
01.02.26
SBOMS and supply chains
Anthony Harrison
UD2.208 (Decroly)
<p>The growing use of Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs) has introduced a new challenge with six different types exist (Design, Source, Build, Analysed, Deployed, and Runtime). As each type captures component information at a unique point in the development lifecycle, it is no longer sufficient to say that you want an SBOM' you need the right one which meets your use case. So how do you determine which SBOM type is the right fit for your specific use case?</p> <p>This session attempts to provide ...
01.02.26
SBOMS and supply chains
Marta Rybczynska
UD2.208 (Decroly)
<p>Modern embedded products are no longer single-processor devices. A typical architecture combines a Linux-based main system, one or more microcontrollers running RTOS workloads, and cloud-side processing also running on Linux. Each of these components produces its own SBOM - often using different formats, tooling, and levels of detail.</p> <p>But what happens when you need to use all of them together for vulnerability management?</p> <p>This talk shares a real-world journey of attempting to ...
01.02.26
SBOMS and supply chains
UD2.208 (Decroly)
<p>Various tools producing SBOMs for pre-built artifacts, such as container images, usually provide only a flat list of components - packages, libraries, RPMs, and binaries - without explaining where any of them originated. But why does this origin information matter, and how can we obtain it?</p> <p>To simply introduce the concept, imagine your build ecosystem as a bakery: the built container is the loaf of bread, and your SBOM is the ingredient label on the package. While customers only see a ...
01.02.26
SBOMS and supply chains
UD2.208 (Decroly)
<p>When a new CVE surfaces in an open-source dependency, teams face an immediate question: Do we really need to update? Is the vulnerability <strong>eploitable</strong>? In practice, nearly 90% of reported issues never affect the consuming application, but identifying the critical 10% is far from trivial. Reachability analysis offers a path forward by tracing vulnerable functions from the upstream component through multi-hop call graphs to determine whether the affected code is ever invoked ...
01.02.26
SBOMS and supply chains
Stefano Pentassuglia
UD2.208 (Decroly)
<p>The modern software supply chain is no longer suffering from a lack of data. Between SBOMs, SLSA provenance, and vulnerability scans, DevOps teams are drowning in attestations. However, a critical gap remains: the ability to aggregate this diverse evidence and enforce consistent, automated security decisions. Simply having an SBOM does not secure your pipeline; verifying its content against a trusted policy does.</p> <p>In this talk, we introduce <strong>Conforma</strong>, an open-source tool ...
01.02.26
SBOMS and supply chains
Max Mehl
UD2.208 (Decroly)
<p>500,000 SBOMs -- that's the scale of Deutsche Bahn's software supply chain. We will show how we extend our automated collection of Source, Build, Artifact, and Runtime SBOMs from both internal systems and external suppliers, and how we make this data usable. Doing this, we understand that SBOMs are not a tool by themselves but a supporting method for various use-cases. To facilitate them, we heavily rely on FOSS tools, enriched with own logic to fit into our enterprise architecture. You love ...