Security

Security of Cardiac Implantable Electronic Devices

Cardiac Implantable Electronic Devices (CIED), such as cardiac pacemakers and defibrillators, are a fairly niche target for security researchers, in part due to a lack of manufacturer cooperation and device accessibility. This talk aims to provide insights into the challenges in device development and methods with which to research device security. Data accessibility to patients will be touched upon.
CIEDs may adversely affect patients implanted with such devices should their security be compromised. Although some efforts to secure these devices can be noted, it has quite often been lacking and may thus enable patient harm or data confidentiality compromise by malicious actors. Given the vast consequences of security vulnerabilities within this industry, the author aims to provide insight into the challenges associated with designing security architectures for such platforms, as well as possible methodology of researching these devices safely even when lacking manufacturer cooperation and access to device programmers. Data collected by CIEDs and transmitted through remote monitoring is an additional concern for patients. Whilst research has shown that most manufacturers do respond in a timely and comprehensive fashion to GDPR requests, immediate data access is not yet possible and requires the patient to reach out to their doctors to obtain the requisite (event) data. A proposed solution is presented on how a patient communicator may be designed to allow patients interested in their autonomy to perform limited device interrogation in a safe and secure manner.

Weitere Infos

Live Stream https://streaming.media.ccc.de/39c3/one
Format Talk
Sprache Englisch

Weitere Sessions

27.12.25
Security
Jade Sheffey
Zero
The Great Firewall of China (GFW) is one of, if not arguably the most advanced Internet censorship systems in the world. Because repressive governments generally do not simply publish their censorship rules, the task of determining exactly what is and isn’t allowed falls upon the censorship measurement community, who run experiments over censored networks. In this talk, we’ll discuss two ways censorship measurement has evolved from passive experimentation to active attacks against the Great ...
27.12.25
Security
Fuse
Reports of GNSS interference in the Baltic Sea have become almost routine — airplanes losing GPS, ships drifting off course, and timing systems failing. But what happens when a group of engineers decides to build a navigation system that simply *doesn’t care* about the jammer? Since 2017, we’ve been developing **R-Mode**, a terrestrial navigation system that uses existing radio beacons and maritime infrastructure to provide independent positioning — no satellites needed. In this talk, ...
27.12.25
Security
Christoph Saatjohann
Zero
Zwei Jahre nach dem ersten KIM-Vortrag auf dem 37C3: Die gezeigten Schwachstellen wurden inzwischen geschlossen. Weiterhin können mit dem aktuellen KIM 1.5+ nun große Dateien bis 500 MB übertragen werden, das Signaturhandling wurde für die Nutzenden vereinfacht, indem die Detailinformationen der Signatur nicht mehr einsehbar sind. Aber ist das System jetzt sicher oder gibt es neue Probleme?
27.12.25
Security
tihmstar
One
While trying to apply fault injection to the AMD Platform Security Processor with unusual (self-imposed) requirements/restrictions, it were software bugs which stopped initial glitching attempts. Once discovered, the software bug was used as an entry to explore the target, which in turn lead to uncovering (and exploiting) more and more bugs, ending up in EL3 of the most secure core on the chip. This talk is about the story of trying to glitch the AMD Platform Security Processor, then ...
27.12.25
Security
One
The Deutschlandticket was the flagship transport policy of the last government, rolled out in an impressive timescale for a political project; but this speed came with a cost - a system ripe for fraud at an industrial scale. German public transport is famously decentralised, with thousands of individual companies involved in ticketing and operations. Unifying all of these under one national, secure, system has proven a challenge too far for politicians. The end result: losses in the hundreds of ...
27.12.25
Security
Ground
In August 2024, Raspberry Pi released their newest MCU: The RP2350. Alongside the chip, they also released the RP2350 Hacking Challenge: A public call to break the secure boot implementation of the RP2350. This challenge concluded in January 2025 and led to five exciting attacks discovered by different individuals. In this talk, we will provide a technical deep dive in the RP2350 security architecture and highlight the different attacks. Afterwards, we talk about two of the breaks in ...
27.12.25
Security
Fuse
FreeBSD’s jail mechanism promises strong isolation—but how strong is it really? In this talk, we explore what it takes to escape a compromised FreeBSD jail by auditing the kernel’s attack surface, identifying dozens of vulnerabilities across exposed subsystems, and developing practical proof-of-concept exploits. We’ll share our findings, demo some real escapes, and discuss what they reveal about the challenges of maintaining robust OS isolation.