Security
Breaking Honeypots for Fun and Profit
December 30, 2015
4:00 PM – 5:00 PM Add to calendar
4:00 PM – 5:00 PM Add to calendar
Hall 1
We will detect, bypass, and abuse honeypot technologies and solutions, turning them against the defender. We will also release a global map of honeypot deployments, honeypot detection vulnerabilities, and supporting code.
The concept of a honeypot is strong, but the way honeypots are implemented is inherently weak, enabling an attacker to easily detect and bypass them, as well as make use of them for his own purposes. Our methods are analyzing the network protocol completeness and operating system software implementation completeness, and vulnerable code.
As a case study, we will concentrate on platforms deployed in real organizational networks, mapping them globally, and demonstrating how it is possible to both bypass and use these honeypots to the attacker's advantage.
Additional information
| Type | lecture |
|---|---|
| Language | English |
More sessions
| 12/27/15 |
Can we build trustworthy client systems on x86 hardware? What are the main challenges? What can we do about them, realistically? Is there anything we can?
|
| 12/27/15 |
Unser Vortrag demonstriert einen PLC-only Wurm. Der PLC-Wurm kann selbstständig ein Netzwerk nach Siemens Simatic S7-1200 Geräten in den Versionen 1 bis 3 durchsuchen und diese befallen. Hierzu ist keine Unterstützung durch PCs oder Server erforderlich. Der Wurm „lebt“ ausschließlich in den PLCs.
|
| 12/27/15 |
Dr. Peter Laackmann und Marcus Janke zeigen mit einem tiefen Einblick in die Welt der Hardware-Trojaner, auf welchem Wege „Institutionen“ versuchen können, sich versteckten Zugang zu Sicherheits-Hardware zu verschaffen.
|
| 12/27/15 |
Key-Loggers are cool, really cool. It seems, however, that every conceivable aspect of key-logging has already been covered: from physical devices to hooking techniques. What possible innovation could be left in this field?
|
| 12/27/15 |
This presentation covers windows kernel driver security issues. It'll discuss some background, and then give an overview of the most common issues seen in drivers, covering both finding and fixing issues.
|
| 12/27/15 |
Did you ever want to have access to a few hundred thousand network end points? Or a few hundred thousand phone numbers? A short look behind the curtains of how not to do network security.
|
| 12/27/15 |
For years SCADA StrangeLove team speaks about vulnerabilities in Industrial Control Systems. Now we want to show by example of railway the link between information security and industrial safety and demonstrate how a root access gained in a few minutes can bring to naught all the years of efforts that were devoted to the improvement of fail-safety and reliability of the ICS system. Railroads is a complex systems and process automation is used in different areas: to control power, switches, ...
|
