Security
Running your own 3G/3.5G network
OpenBSC reloaded
Seven years after presenting „running your own GSM network“, we are back presenting about how to do the same for 3G (UMTS/HSPA) networks.
Seven years ago, the now famous „running your own GSM network“ talk was held at 25C3, paving the way for a first step into the then-new field of applied research (aka hacking) into mobile communications research.
The result of that talk is what is known as OpenBSC. Together with its sister-projects OsmoBTS, OsmoPCU, OsmoNITB, OsmoSGSN and OpenGGSN are commonly used to run GSM/GPRS networks as a means to perform security research, offensive as well as defensive.
Now, the team behind those projects has finally started work on supporting 3G base station hardware, extending the scope from 2G/2.5G/2.75G technologies towards UMTS, HSDPA and HSUPA.
The talk will cover
* what was/is required to implement in terms of the protocol stacks,
* the current status of this work,
* how it integrates into the Osmo* world,
* how it is envisioned to be usd in mobile security research.
Like at 25C3, there will also be a demo, of course..
Additional information
| Type | lecture |
|---|---|
| Language | English |
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