Security
On Smart Cities, Smart Energy, And Dumb Security
Smart City is an abstract concept everyone talks about but no one knows what it actually means. No one, except Energy utilities.
In this talk we will explore the vast world of Smart Energy, and see how energy providers used the "Smart City" concept to get better control over our energy consumption, all while almost completely ignoring security aspects along the way.
Join me and see how Smart Energy is making our lives a little bit better, but also dangerously insecure.
While "Smart Cities" are starting to pop all over the world, no city has ever standardized what that term actually means. Smart Energy, on the other hand, has been standardized both by governments and by large private utilities.
This positive regulation made the Smart Energy market one of the largest IoT industries today, with over 100,000,000 smart devices currently implemented at consumer premises by utilities all over the world.
In this talk We will dive into the Smart Grid, exploring security issues both in the utility infrastructure and the Smart Meters present at consumers. We will explore the magical world called ZigBee, the confusing world of incomplete RFCs, and the hazardous world of insecure wireless devices that control your electricity grid.
You will leave this talk with a much better understanding at what's going on in your city, your energy provider, and, surprisingly, your home; And trust me, it won't make you feel any better.
Additional information
| Type | lecture |
|---|---|
| Language | English |
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