Hardware-Aided Trusted Computing
SGX Enclave Exploit Analysis and Considerations for Defensive SGX Programming
<p>Intel SGX provided a mechanism to better isolate user-level software from attackers. However, attackers will still use various methods to attack SGX and user’s Enclaves. And user’s code inside Enclave may also have bugs, which can be leveraged by the attackers. We are from intel SGX SDK team, we have conducted security analysis and pen-test for SGX Enclave (based on SGX SDK) during the past 10+ years. We want to summarize some past exploits we encountered in our daily work and what's the mitigation, hope it can help the Enclave developers to write more secure Enclave code.</p>
Target topics category:
TEE-specific attacks and defenses (vulnerabilities, exploits, defensive programming)
Purpose:
Explain the Security Properties of Intel® SGX Technology.
Help Enclave Developers write more secure code within an enclave.
Analyze a sampling of enclave defense-in-depth strategies and protections against known attacks.
SGX Enclave Security and Challenge:
Code running within the enclave must be written securely.
Poorly written code may be subject to attack by various methods.
Developers must also be aware of potential side-channel attacks on code.
Additional information
| Type | devroom |
|---|
More sessions
| 2/5/22 |
<p>A brief introduction to the room and to the sessions.</p>
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>Gramine (formerly called "Graphene") is a lightweight library OS, designed to run a single Linux application in an isolated environment. Currently, Gramine runs on Linux and Intel SGX enclaves on Linux platforms. With Intel SGX support, Gramine can secure a critical application in a hardware-encrypted memory region and protect the application from a malicious system stack with minimal porting effort ("lift and shift" approach).</p> <p>Several major events happened to the Gramine project in ...
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>The Enarx project reached a huge milestone: its first official release, featuring WebAssembly runtime. WebAssembly and Confidential Computing are a great match because WebAssembly offers developers a wide range of language choices, it works across silicon architectures, and it provides a sandboxed environment. This presentation will highlight the benefits of WebAssembly to Confidential Computing and showcase some demos.</p>
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>Short break.</p>
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>Veracruz is a framework for designing and deploying privacy-preserving computations amongst a group of mutually mistrusting individuals. Veracruz uses strong isolation technologies, such as AWS Nitro Enclaves, Arm CCA Realms, and the high-assurance seL4 hypervisor, to provide a safe, neutral ground, within which a sandboxed WebAssembly program executes. Recent enhancements to Veracruz have made it possible to support larger, more complex privacy-preserving computations: we have adopted the ...
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>The confidentiality and integrity guarantees offered by Intel SGX enclaves can be easily thwarted if the enclave has not been properly designed. Its interface with the untrusted software stack is a perhaps the largest attack surface that adversaries can exploit; unintended interactions with untrusted code can expose the enclave to memory corruption attacks, for instance.</p> <p>We have proposed a notion, called orderliness, that embodies good practice set out by academic papers and the ...
|
| 2/5/22 |
<p>Lunch break</p>
|
